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This paper examines the effect of ownership 
structure on the level of non-financial information 
(NFI hereafter) disclosure contextualized in Italy 
where there is high ownership concentration. This 
research seeks to understand the extent under 
which NFI mandatory disclosure is related to 
ownership concentration. As a matter of fact, the 
concentrated ownership may affect NFI disclosure, 
depending on the different viewpoints with respect 
to CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) practices 
(Faller, 2018). Such an implementation might depend 
on the cost of investing in these activities and 
eventually, on the demand for public disclosure, 
which may be weak in comparison with companies 
with lower ownership concentration (Muttakin & 
Khan, 2014). Furthermore, this research draws 
insights from the recent mandatory requirements on 
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This study investigates the relationship between non-financial 
information (NFI) mandatory disclosure and ownership 
concentration in the Italian context, which is characterized by 
pyramidal groups and high ownership concentration. Hence, the 
intent is to understand to what extent NFI mandatory disclosure 
might be related to ownership concentration. In pursuing this 
objective, the empirical research examines 141 listed Italian 
companies that are obliged to prepare their NFI in accordance 
with Italian Legislative Decree 254/2016. The study addresses the 
following research method. First, the research develops an NFI 
disclosure score based on a dichotomous approach following a 
quantitative content analysis of the 2017 non-financial 
statements to assess their level of compliance. Then, it develops a 
multivariate regression analysis to test whether or not, and if so, 
to what extent, ownership concentration affects the disclosure of 
NFI. We aim to enhance the academic debate in light of the path 
development of NFI disclosure under mandatory requirements 
and the increased awareness around responsible business 
practices. Moreover, it draws insights on the controversial results 
of the relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) when the disclosure around 
sustainability issues becomes compulsory. 
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Directive has obliged public interest entities to 
report non-financial information disclosure starting 
from the 2017 financial year. In Italy, the 
requirements on the disclosure of NFI have been 
transposed through the Legislative Decree 
254/2016. The requirements demand the disclosure 
of the business model, related policies and 
outcomes, risks and opportunities, and non-financial 
key performance indicators related to five content 
topics – environmental, social, employee, human 
rights and anti-corruption. Hence, these mandatory 
requirements have turned the reporting of certain 
CSR initiatives into an imperative procedure from a 
voluntary basis.  
In light of the path developments in the realm 
of NFI disclosure, few academic works have provided 
evidence for the level of compliance with this 
regulation (Hummel & Schlick, 2016; Chelli, 
Durocher, & Fortin, 2018; Schneider, Michelon, & 
Paananen, 2018; Cantino et al., 2019; Fiandrino, 
2019). Moreover, there is no clear-cut relationship 
between CSR initiatives and ownership 
concentration (Faller, 2018); thus, we contribute to 
such a debate contextualised in a mandatory regime 
of NFI disclosure.  
The intent is to address these gaps by 
illustrating the level of compliance of NFI with the 
new regulatory requirements and examining the 
relationship between NFI mandatory disclosure and 
ownership concentration. We select Italy as a setting 
of investigation and the rationale for choosing Italy 
as the target of this study is attributed to its 
characterization of pyramidal groups and high 
ownership concentration (Barca, 1994; Aganin & 
Volpin, 2005; Minetti & Paiella, 2012). 
Along with these premises, the investigation is 
based on the 141 Italian companies that are obliged 
to prepare the non-financial statements in 
accordance with the Italian Legislative Decree No. 
254/2016 starting from the 2017 financial year. The 
research addresses a quantitative content analysis of 
the company’s 2017 non-financial statements and 
develops an NFI disclosure score to assess the level 
of such a disclosure. Then, it develops a multivariate 
regression analysis to test whether or not, and if so, 
to what extent, ownership concentration affects NFI 
mandatory disclosure.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as 
follows. Section 2 reviews the prior literature which 
investigates the relationship between non-financial 
information and ownership concentration, and then 
it analyses the Italian context as a set of study. 
Within this context, the research is teased out. 
Section 3 explains the research method employed in 
the present study, and then Section 4 examines the 
results. In Section 5 the paper discusses research 
implications and then, it ends by acknowledging 
limitations and drawing avenues for future 
developments.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. The relationship between non-financial 
information disclosure and ownership structure 
 
Gray, Owen, and Maunders (1987) firstly defined NFI 
disclosure as “the process of communicating the 
social and environmental effects of organizations 
(particularly companies) beyond the traditional role 
of providing a financial account to the owners of 
capital, in particular shareholders” (p. 9). Along with 
the development path of NFI disclosure, the 
accounting literature originally focused on NFI 
voluntary disclosure and the effects proven by such 
an approach. These studies have demonstrated that 
NFI voluntary disclosure enhances transparency, 
improves reputation and brand value (Hahn & 
Kühnen, 2013), affects firm value (Cahan et al., 
2016), increases share prices (De Villiers & Marques, 
2016), reduces the cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al., 
2011, 2012). Hence, higher levels of disclosure on 
sustainability aspects lead to lower equity costs, and 
such reductions can be explained by the decrease of 
asymmetric information among parties. Martínez-
Ferrero, Ruiz-Cano, and García-Sánchez (2016), as 
well as Hung-Yuan (2014), confirm that the 
reduction of asymmetry information plays a crucial 
role in the sense that non-financial disclosure 
quality reduces the cost of capital by decreasing 
information asymmetry. In greater details, firms that 
promote Environmental, Social, and Governance 
(better known as ESG) disclosure to reduce 
information asymmetry achieve low capital costs 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2011).  
When considering the relationship between CSR 
issues and ownership structure, there is no 
unanimous consensus yet (Faller, 2018). Literature 
generally classifies ownership into the following 
types: the presence of a strong block holder, such as 
a family; state ownership; national institutional 
ownership; the presence of foreign investors 
(Rizzato et al., 2018). 
By following these classifications, accounting 
scholars have originally disentangled the effects 
proven by ownership concentration on NFI 
disclosure on a voluntary basis. The recent academic 
review of Faller (2018) has identified contradictory 
findings of prior research on the relationship 
between CSR and equity ownership. The study has 
reviewed academic papers and has addressed the 
dubious nexus with a narrative-based assessment of 
empirical results. The findings have highlighted a 
sharp inconclusiveness with “positive correlations 
(four studies), negative correlations (seven studies), 
or no conclusive correlation (two studies)”. 
Supporting negative relations argue that closely-held 
equity owners are less inclined to support external 
CSR activities with high costs which shorten the 
distribution of short-term profits (Mackenzie, Rees, 
& Rodionova, 2013). In more details, when 
companies with high ownership concentration incur 
a large amount of costs related to CSR and 
sustainability issues (Clark & Hebb, 2005; Mackenzie, 
Rees, & Rodionova, 2013) and the identification of 
clear-cut costs and benefits for shareholders is 
tricky to identify (Barnea & Rubin, 2010), 
concentrated shareholders may be less interested in 
pursuing such CSR practices. In fact, when CSR 
activities are costly, they may decrease short-term 
profits available for distribution, thus shareholders’ 
income will be limited (Rees & Rodionova, 2013). For 
such reasons, when equity ownership is 
concentrated, CSR activities might be less spread, 
namely the relationship is negative. Similarly, other 
studies which primarily has focused on family 
ownership have argued that family-oriented 
companies tend to disclose less information on CSR 
initiatives. It has been suggested that accountability 
and organizational legitimacy are not paramount of 
importance because external interests are likely to 
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be small (Chau & Gray, 2002; Muttakin & Khan, 
2014). The work of Muttakin and Khan (2014) has 
confirmed the negative association on the extent of 
CSR disclosure and family ownership. The research 
has addressed the determinants of CSR disclosure 
on a sample of Bangladeshi listed companies during 
the period 2005-2009 and they have found a 
negative relationship between CSR disclosure and 
family ownership. This leads the authors to consider 
that “family owners are less concerned about public 
accountability and organizational legitimacy” 
(p. 172). The study of Chau and Gray (2002) 
considered that the management board can be less 
interested in engaging with socially responsible 
practices because the benefits could be lower than 
the related initial costs. The study has assessed 
strategic information, nonfinancial information and 
financial information, and, for the nonfinancial 
information section, it takes into consideration 
(1) information about directors, (2) employee 
information, (3) social policy and value-added 
information. Findings have confirmed hypothesis in 
favour of a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between NFI disclosure and family 
ownership which remains valid for each disclosure 
sub-section. Thus, it can be argued that “non-
financial information is directed more toward a 
corporation’s social accountability and targeted at a 
wider spectrum of stakeholders than the owners/ 
investors” (p. 251). 
Oppositely, other academic works have 
highlighted a positive relationship between CSR and 
equity ownership concentration in response to 
corporate reputation and image (Dyer Jr & Whetten, 
2006; Consolandi, Nascenzi, & Jaiswal-Dale, 2008; 
Prado‐Lorenzo, Gallego‐Alvarez, & Garcia‐Sanchez, 
2009). Among the others, the research of Laguir, 
Laguir, and Elbaz (2016) embraces the stewardship 
theory and sustains the idea that “family firms are 
more likely than non-family firms to see their 
stakeholders as partners” (p. 389), because are much 
more likely to see long-term orientation challenges 
to sustain future generations. With this view, CSR 
activities are more developed in family firms of 
second and following generations against family 
firms in their first generation. Ultimately, the 
accounting literature has originally disentangled the 
effects proven by ownership concentration on NFI 
disclosure by following a voluntary approach. 
All prior things considered and anchored to 
Fallen (2018)’s work, discrepancies of results on the 
relationship between CSR preferences and 
ownership equity is linked to the analysis of 
different types of shareholders, country-specific 
compositions of shareholder types, and 
furthermore, they rely on voluntary approaches of 
such an NFI disclosure. This might influence the 
results in opposite directions. Accordingly, a great 
contextualization of the territory of investigation is 
extremely relevant, and this is even greater 
emphasised when turning a voluntary-based 
approach on NFI disclosure to an NFI mandatory 
adequacy. 
The progressive change to NFI mandatory 
disclosure from a voluntary basis has raised 
numerous calls for regulatory adequacy to ensure 
data comparability (Beck, Dumay, & Frost, 2017) to 
allows investors to keep up-to-date information for 
their investment decisions (Overland, 2007) based 
on ESG criteria and avoid misleading behaviours due 
to the existence of a uniform process. A compulsory 
approach to disclosure provides data comparability 
as well as the standardised and transparent ways for 
analysing companies’ social and environmental 
impacts. The progressive movement towards “more 
uniform, standardised, and globally accepted 
practices of business sustainability and 
sustainability reporting and assurance” has become 
paramount of importance; thus, mandatory 
requirements have been set up with Directive 
95/2014/EU on the disclosure of NFI. Few papers 
focus on mandatory disclosure (Chelli, Durocher, & 
Fortin, 2018), while recent academic notes 
emphasise the need to deepen the analysis of such 
disclosure’s mandatory requirements (Schneider, 
Michelon, & Paananen, 2018; Cantino et al., 2019; 
Rizzato et al., 2019). This necessity is even more 
adamantly emphasised in light of the recent 
harmonisation towards the regulatory framework in 
accordance with Directive 95/2014/EU. The next 
section teases out the context of the present 
research. 
 
2.2.  Non-financial information mandatory 
disclosure and ownership concentration mirrored 
in the context of Italy 
 
In Italy, the path towards the development of NFI 
mandatory disclosure has its origins in the 
amendments of Article 2428 of the Civil Code in 
2007, as modified in order to adopt the Directive 
2003/51/EC. The Directive, also known as 
Modernization Directive forced European companies 
to address and explain in their annual reports – 
within the management report – “both financial and, 
where appropriate, non-financial key performance 
indicators relevant to the particular business, 
including information relating to environmental and 
employee matters’’ (European Parliament, 2003; 
emphasis added). One year after, the Italian National 
Council of Chartered Accountants (Consiglio 
Nazionale dei Dottori Commercialisti e degli Esperti 
Contabili (CNDCEC)) recommended the inclusion of 
such kind of “soft information” with strategic 
implications closely related to the business itself 
and its operating activities. For instance, when 
talking about a gas and oil company whose activities 
might affect the environment, stakeholders might be 
interested to understand the company’s risks 
exposure to toxicity of petroleum which harms the 
environment through air and water pollution 
(CNDCEC; 2008). In 2016, the Italian legislator 
brought the Directive 95/2014/UE (European 
Parliament, 2013) into force with the Legislative 
Decree No. 254/16 (Decree hereafter).  
The Decree obliges public-interest entities to 
prepare the non-financial statement by including the 
disclosure on the business model, related policies, 
outcomes, and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), as 
well as risks and opportunities, related to, at a 
minimum, environmental, social, and employee 
matters and regarding human rights, anti-corruption 
issues. It leaves a broad margin of discretion with 
respect to the reporting channels to disclose such 
information, namely the alternative to presenting a 
distinctive section within the management report or 
presenting a separate report while specifying this 
choice in the management report. Furthermore, 
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companies can autonomously choose which type of 
international standard framework to rely on. They 
can anchor to the European Union-based 
frameworks, such as the Eco-Management and Audit 
Scheme (EMAS) or international standards 
frameworks such as the United Nation (UN) Global 
Compact, the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Right, the International Organization for 
Standardization’s ISO 26000 or the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) (European Parliament, 2014). 
Eventually, companies can implement self-reporting 
schemes by adopting more than one international 
framework. Explorative insights into the level of 
compliance and the adequacy of the new regulatory 
requirements have been recently provided in 2018 
by Consob, the Italian authority responsible for 
regulating the Italian securities market also known 
as Commissione Nazionale per le società e la Borsa. 
The aim of the report has been twofold. First, it 
aimed to review how the Italian listed firms have 
implemented the non-financial information 
disclosure, considering whether they have assessed 
the materiality analysis and whether they have 
established a process with both an internal and an 
external assessment. To accomplish this objective, 
data have been collected from non-financial 
statements. Second, the report has explored whether 
companies have considered non-financial issues 
relevant at the board level. To do so, the study has 
conducted a survey involving the members of the 
Italian community of non-executive and independent 
directors (Nedcommunity). The survey has 
investigated whether independent directors engage 
with non-financial information disclosure and 
whether they have been keen to enact a cultural 
renewal of internal processes, reporting tools, and 
corporate governance systems towards the 
integration of sustainability issues into the 
company’s business model. Referring to the analysis 
of the 2017 non-financial statements, the results 
have shown that 151 companies published non-
financial statements by the end of 2018, and in so 
doing, they have presented overlapping and 
disparate documentations for each other: “139 
companies have only published the information 
required by the Decree, either in a standalone 
document (called Sustainability Report in 53 cases) 
or in the management report; six firms have 
published an Integrated Report (IR), embedding the 
NFS; two issuers have published both an Integrated 
Report and a separate Sustainability Report (SR); one 
firm has released an Integrated Report and a 
Sustainability Report as an NFS; three companies 
have circulated both an NFS and a Sustainability 
Report”(p. 6). The intent of this new requirement lies 
in drawing up comparable non-financial statements; 
however, such a managerial discretion could 
contribute to loose specification with 
counterproductive effects on the level of disclosure 
as the Modernization Directive (2003/51/EC) 
produced in 2003 (Bini et al., 2017).  
Drawing on these argumentations, there is a 
notable and conspicuous trend in favour of the 
evolution of NFI disclosure under a mandatory-
based approach. The new regulatory requirements 
enact adequacy regarding organizational processes, 
reporting tools, and the active promotion and 
enhancement of strategies for sustainability issues 
at the core of business activities. Therefore, the 
current context constitutes an ideal setting of 
investigation. Italy is characterized by ownership 
concentration, namely the presence of a strong block 
holder. In recent years, the presence of institutional 
investors (national and foreign) in company 
ownership has increased importance, and on the 
other hand, some big groups have as a shareholder 
the Italian state (Rizzato et al., 2018). Since the 
Italian capital market is dominated by a high degree 
of ownership concentration and due to a 
considerable presence of individual owners that hold 
sizable equity stakes in companies (Minetti & Paiella, 
2012), it might be of interest to understand which 
role the ownership concentration plays in disclosing 
NFI. As literature has provided controversial results, 
we do not hypothesise a certain sign of relationship.  
Consequently, we posit the following research 
question:  
RQ: To what extent does ownership 
concentration affect NFI mandatory disclosure?  
In keeping with this research question, the 
study proceeds with a twofold subsequent research 
procedure. First, it assesses the level of compliance 
in the first year of the regulation; second, it verifies 
whether ownership concentration affects the level of 
NFI mandatory disclosure in the context of Italy. 
 
3.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Sample of investigation 
 
The initial sample of investigation has included 244 
groups listed to the Italian Stock Exchange which 
belong to the FTSE MIB, the FTSE Italia Mid Cap, and 
the FTSE Small Cap on December 29, 2017. Table 1 
summaries the sample screening.  
 
Table 1. Sample selection procedure 
 
Description Observation 
Initial sample from the Italian Stock 
Exchange 
244 
Screening of companies not continuously 
listed (suspended) 
(1) 
Screening of foreign companies or 
companies with headquarters outside Italy 
(not obliged to be compliant with the Italian 
Legislative Decree 254/2016) 
(11) 
Screening of Italian companies outside the 
scope of the Italian Legislative Decree 
(number of employees < 500) 
(78) 
Screening of Italian companies that did not 
present the 2017 non-financial statement 
(4) 
Sample under the mandatory requirement of 
the Italian Legislative Decree 254/2016 
150 
Outliers from the regression analysis (9) 
Sample under investigation 141 
 
We have excluded one listed Italian company whose 
shares were suspended at the end of December 
2017. 11 foreign companies and companies with 
headquarters outside Italy have been also removed 
from the analysis as they do not have to be 
compliant with the Italian Legislative Decree, and 78 
listed Italian companies did not meet the criteria of 
the Italian Legislative Decree 254/2016. In more 
details, 73 companies out of 78 had, on average, less 
than 500 employees in the 2016-2017 financial 
period, so they are out of the scope of this study. 
Data on the average number of employees have been 
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gathered on DataStream1 at the end of December 
2017. 5 companies out of 78 were subsidiaries of 
other listed companies, and they have decided not to 
present a non-financial statement, as it has been 
provided by the parent company; therefore, we have 
removed them accordingly. Finally, 4 companies 
have not presented the 2017 non-financial 
statement. Specifically, one company has been 
omitted from the initial sample because of the 
change in the closing date of its financial year, which 
had a duration of 15 months (from October 1, 2016 
to December 31, 2017). As the Decree applies to 
financial years beginning on or after January 1, 
2017, this company has decided to not present the 
2017 non-financial statement. Furthermore, the 
study has not considered two other listed companies 
in the sample since their last annual report dated 
back to 2016, and one listed company has been 
excluded because its annual report was not 
available. The sample of listed companies under the 
mandatory requirement of the Italian Legislative 
Decree 254/2016 of our research consists of 150 
listed Italian companies. Consob issued the list of 
the Italian listed companies (151 in total) for which 
the 2017 non-financial statement was available by 
August 31, 2018 (Delibera No. 20586, September 20, 
2018). 
In this research, we have ultimately excluded 9 
companies as outliers of the regression analysis. The 
research has ended with a sample of 141 
observations. Appendix A provides the list of the 
Italian listed companies included in our sample and 
specifies the company name, the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) taxonomy, the FTSE 
Italia All-Share composition, i.e. Ftse Mib, Ftse Italia 
Mid Cap, and Ftse Italia Small Cap2. All the listed 
companies under analysis have the headquarter in 
Italy as this constitutes the mandatory requirement 
to be compliant with the Italian Legislative Decree 
254/2016.  
In order to understand whether the sample 
under analysis fairly represents an accurate 
reflection, we have compared the market 
capitalization of all Italian listed companies at the 
end of December 2017 (244 groups) with the 141 
groups analysed. Table 2 shows the comparative 






                                                          
1 DataStream is a financial time series database owned by Thomson Reuters. 
It provides global financial and macro-economic data like for instance 
economic time series, macro forecasts, economics point in time, equities, 
equity indices, I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System) estimates and 
global aggregates, fundamentals (as reported and standardised), ASSET4 
Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG), fixed income 
securities, bonds and bond indices, credit default swaps (https://infobase. 
thomsonreuters.com/infobase/login/?next=/infobase/). The average number of 
employees collected in DataStream is the average of employees at the 
beginning and at the end of the fiscal year 2017. 
2 The FTSE MIB Index includes shares are selected from the universe of 
stock trading on the Borsa Italiana (BIt) MTA and MIV markets. The FTSE 
MIB Index measures the performance of 40 shares listed on Borsa Italiana to 
ensure the index best represents the Italian equity markets for investors. It 
captures approximately 80% of the domestic market capitalisation broad 
Italian equity universe. The FTSE Italia Mid Cap Index includes the first 60 
shares out of the FTSE MIB which are classified according the domestic 
market capitalisation in terms of liquidity and free float. The FTSE Italia 
Small Cap Index includes the other shares which are both out of the FTSE 
MIB and the FTSE Mid Cap (https://www.borsaitaliana.it). 
Table 2. Sample description 
 
Description 
N. of groups 




Capitalisation at the 
end of December 
2017 (in Eur M) 
Sample under 
analysis in our 
study 
141 498.963,54 




of our study 
57,78% 79,60% 
 
3.2.  Empirical model 
 
The research performs the ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression model to determine the 
relationships between ownership concentration and 




=  𝐵0  + 𝐵1(𝑂𝑊𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶)𝑖  
+  𝐵2(𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑇)𝑖  
+  𝐵3(𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇_𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅)𝑖  
+  𝐵4(𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸_𝑀𝐼𝐵)𝑖  
+  𝐵5(𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿)𝑖  
+  𝐵6(𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴)𝑖 + 𝐵7(𝑅𝑂𝐸)𝑖
+ 𝐵8(𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁)𝑖  




NFI_DISCLOSURE = the level of NFI mandatory 
disclosure calculated with an index. 
OWN_CONC = the sum of the percentage of 
shares held by the three largest relevant 
shareholders according to Rossi et al. (2018). 
REPORT_FORMAT = the type of report where 
NFI has been disclosed for the 2017 financial year. It 
is a dummy variable and is equal to 1 when NFI has 
been presented in the Annual Report, 0 when NFI 
has been in a separate report.  
REPORT_YEAR = the number of years of the 
reporting of NFI and sustainability issues. When 
REPORT_YEAR is equal to 1 means that the company 
has started to disclose NFI for 1 year. 
FTSE_MIB = the distinction between companies 
which belong to the FTSE MIB (in this case, the 
variable is equal to 1) and companies which do not 
belong to the FTSE MIB (in this case, the variable is 
equal to 0). 
FINANCIAL = the distinction between 
companies which belong to the financial sector like 
banks and insurance companies (in this case, the 
variable is equal to 1) and companies which do not 
belong to the financial sector. 
BETA = the market beta for each company of 
the fiscal year-end categorized as risky measure. 
ROE = Return on Equity for each company of 
the fiscal year-end as performance measure, namely 
as the ratio of net income scaled by total 
shareholder equity. 
TOBIN = the market’s assessment of a 
company’s riskiness of future cash flow, namely the 
ratio of the market value of assets to the 
replacement costs of assets (Cheng, 2008; Jermias & 
Gani, 2014). 
LN_EMPLOYEES = the number of employees 
scaled in logarithm as a measure of size. 
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Table 3 classifies all the variables taken into 
account, addressing the type, the classification, the 
source of data The next subsections explain the 
construction of the NFI disclosure score as 
dependent variable and the consideration of 
ownership concentration as independent variable 
and, finally, the variables as controls. 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptions of variable 
 
Variables Description Classification 
Type of 
variable 
Source of data 
NFI_DISCLOSURE 
is the level of NFI mandatory disclosure calculated with 




from the NFI 
statements 
OWN_CONC 
is the sum of the percentage of shares held by the three 







is the type of report where NFI has been disclosed for 
the 2017 financial year. It is a dummy variable and is 
equal to 1 when NFI has been presented in the Annual 
Report, 0 when NFI has been in a separate report. 
Control Dummy 
Hand collection 
from the NFI 
statements 
REPORT_YEAR 
is the number of years of the reporting of NFI and 
sustainability issues. When REPORT_YEAR is equal to 1 




from the NFI 
statements 
FTSE_MIB 
is the distinction between companies which belong to 
the FTSE MIB (in this case, the variable is equal to 1) and 
companies which do not belong to. 
Control Dummy 
Hand collection 
from the Consob 
Database 
FINANCIAL 
is the distinction between companies which belong to 
the financial sector (e.g. banks, insurance companies) 
(in this case, the variable is equal to 1) and companies 
which do not belong to. 
Control Dummy DataStream 
BETA 
is the market beta for each company of the fiscal year-
end categorized as financial risky measure. 
Control Numerical DataStream 
ROE 
is Return on Equity for each company of the fiscal year-
end as performance measure, namely as the ratio of net 
income scaled by total shareholder equity. It is 
categorized as an accounting-based measure. 
Control Numerical DataStream 
TOBIN 
is the market’s assessment of a company’s riskiness of 
future cash flow, namely the ratio of the market value 
of assets to the replacement costs of assets (Cheng, 
2008; Jermias & Gani, 2014). It is categorized as a 
financial-based measure. 
Control Numerical DataStream 
LN_EMPLOYEES 
is the number of employees scaled in logarithm as a 
measure of the size of the company. 
Control Numerical DataStream 
 
3.3. Dependent variable 
 
To define the level of NFI disclosure according to the 
Italian Legislative Decree 254/2016 we developed an 
NFI disclosure score with a quantitative content 
analysis. This method was chosen because it has 
been widely adopted among accounting studies 
(Michelon, Pilonato, & Ricceri, 2015; Melloni, Caglio, 
& Perego, 2017), as it is generally carried out to 
construct disclosure indexes with the adoption of 
weighted or unweighted method criteria, also known 
as ranked or dichotomous scoring (Huang & Watson, 
2015). Content analysis is “a research technique for 
making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or 
other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their 
use” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 18) that “views data as 
representations not of physical events but of texts, 
images, and expressions that are created to be seen, 
read, interpreted, and acted on for their meanings, 
and must therefore be analysed with such uses in 
mind. Analyzing texts in the contexts of their uses 
distinguishes content analysis from other methods 
of inquiry” (Krippendorff, 2013, p. 17). The content 
analysis performed in the present research followed 
two steps, in line with Krippendorff (2004). First, the 
authors developed the checklist containing the 
mandatory requirements of NFI. Second, they 
assessed the 2017 non-financial statement, with a 
specific focus on the computation of items with 
reference to the adopted international standard 
framework.  
 
In the first phase, the research built the 
checklist, and doing so, the analysis followed the 
articles of the decree 254/2016 as an anchor point. 
The checklist included the general topic disclosures 
related to the business models, the policies, related 
results, main risks for each dimension – 
environmental and social issues, employees matters, 
human rights, and anti-corruption. In addition, the 
Decree requires the explanation of the risks which 
might affect the overall business activity of the 
company (Subparagraph 1 – Article 3). The analysis 
considered Subparagraph 3 (Article 3) to compare 
the results with the prior year’s results; therefore, 
for each content dimensions, we included the 
comparison with the prior year. While reading 
Subparagraph 2 (Article 3), we included the 
mentioned specific topic disclosures. Then, we 
addressed the Key Performance Indicator (KPIs) 
measures. In taking into account these quantitative 
measures, we referred to the framework guidelines 
under which the disclosure of the KPIs needs to be 
acknowledged accordingly. Thus, the study 
questioned whether companies relied upon an 
international standards framework against an own 
reporting framework. All the companies were 
checked, and all opted for a framework of 
international standards, favouring the GRI 
Guidelines. Some of them chose more than one 
framework, but, in any case, all the 2017 non-
financial statements adopted the GRI Guidelines. 
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Therefore, to prepare the disclosure score, the KPI 
sections of each content topic were developed 
according to the companies’ chosen GRI Standards. 
The research considered the chosen GRI options 
(GRI-Referenced, Core option, Comprehensive 
option), as each entails different inclusions criteria 
when dealing with topic-specific standards for the 
disclosure of the related KPIs. This means that the 
NFI disclosure score directly accounted for the 
correspondence of discretionary disclosure with the 
adopted international standard framework because 
of their interwoven relationship. All the items of the 
checklist are shown in Appendix B, where it is 
possible to find the related description and the 
classifications (general topic disclosures; topic 
specific disclosures, and ultimately the KPIs 
measures).  
In the second phase, the sentences within the 
non-financial statements were assessed according to 
their content, and therefore assigned as links to the 
items of the checklist. A dichotomous approach was 
adopted for the coding procedure: when a piece of 
non-financial information was identified, value “1” 
was assigned if the information was present, or “0” 
otherwise. The coding “Not Applicable” (NA) was 
taken into consideration in case a disclosure content 
was acknowledged as “not-material topic”, and 
thereby not relevant to be disclosed in each 
compulsory theme in accordance with the law. In 
this sense, the non-financial information disclosure 
score referred to the “unweighted Cooke’s method” 
(Cooke, 1989). Accordingly, the NFI disclosure score 
was defined as follows: 
 











j = the company; 
i = the item; 
d = the item (assumed “1” if the information 
had been presented, otherwise used “0”); and 
x = the material item, which was coded with NA 
(Not Applicable). 
When considering the computation of the KPIs 
measures, the procedure addressed the compliance 
with the chosen GRI. In fact, the GRI options 
(Comprehensive, Core, Referenced) have different 
rules and requirements of disclosure, especially for 
the topic-specific standards. The Comprehensive 
option requires the disclosure of all topic-specific 
standards related to material issues, the Core option 
requires the reporting of at least one topic-specific 
disclosure, and, ultimately, the “GRI-referenced” 
requires the adoption of selected Standards or parts 
of their content to report specific information. This 
alternative is particularly practical for providing 
information on a specific economic, environmental, 
and/or social impact. For instance, if we consider 
the GRI 301 – Materials, we see that there are three 
topic-specific disclosures. For this section, the 
company must provide all the topic-specific 
disclosures option (Disclosure 301-1 11, Disclosure 
301-2 12, and Disclosure 301-3), if the 
Comprehensive was chosen or  at least one if the 
Core option was applied. In case the Referenced 
option was adopted, the organisation must firstly 
indicate whether this content is material, and if so, 
all reporting requirements that correspond to the 
reported disclosures needs to be disclosed. 
Contrarily, such topic-specific disclosures can be 
absent. Based on these typologies, the points for the 
KPI sections were assigned under the conditions of 
the chosen GRI. For example, 20 items as KPIs 
environmental measures were considered from the 
topic-specific disclosures section related to the 
environment. We computed one point in case the 
disclosure of the environmental KPIs was respected 
according to the chosen GRI option. Thus, we 
assigned one point in case the following alternative 
were valid: 1) the all 20 environmental KPIs were 
present in case of the Comprehensive option; 2) at 
least one environmental KPI was present with the 
Core option; 3) the all environmental KPIs related to 
the selected topic-specific disclosures in case of 
Referenced-option. For that reason, the total number 
of hand-collected items was 82 (as shown in 
Appendix A), but the computation of the disclosure 
score was made upon 34 items in total, as the 
different GRI configurations led to more restrictive 
or less bounded KPI disclosures. 
The assessment was developed manually; thus, 
to ensure the reliability of the coding and to 
minimize subjectivity as much as the authors 
possibly could, the following procedure was carried 
out. At an early stage, a pilot test was performed to 
verify the checklist and refine the coding procedure 
accordingly. Then, 20 non-financial statements were 
double-checked to verify and compare the 
classifications, but no significant differences were 
sorted out. Finally, the NFI disclosure score was 
derived to assess the level of compliance with NFI 
disclosure for each observation during the 2017 
financial year. 
 
3.4.  Independent variable and controls 
 
The variable OWN_CONC constitutes our objective of 
interest because we seek to comprehend to what 
extent ownership concentration affects NFI 
mandatory disclosure. That is why ownership 
concentration is our independent variable. We 
calculated OWN_CONC as the sum of the percentage 
of shares held by the three largest relevant 
shareholders in line with prior research (Rossi & 
Cebula, 2016; Rossi, Boylan, & Cebula, 2018). 
According to the Italian Legislative Decree 58/1998 
(so-called “TUF” – “Testo Unico della Finanza”), art. 
120, shareholders of a listed company with an 
interest higher than 3% of the voting rights are 
obliged to communicate their participation to both 
the company and the Italian Stock Exchange 
Commission (Consob). The threshold is increased to 
5% if the listed company is a Small-Medium 
Enterprise. So we collected this information from the 
list published by Consob as available on 30th June 
2017. 
We then took into account the following control 
variables. ANNUAL_FORMAT qualifies the typology 
of documents in which the NFI is presented. In more 
detail, it distinguishes whether the NFI was disclosed 
in the annual report or a standalone report. In the 
first case, the dummy variable ANNUAL_FORMAT 
has a value of 1; in the second case, the dummy 
variable ANNUAL_REPORT gets the value of 0. The 
variable REPORT_YEAR describes the number of 
years that the sustainability and NFI were reported. 
It is a numerical variable and tracks the number of 
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years of NFI disclosure, including the first year of 
mandatory adequacy. Moreover, we included some 
measures for a firm’s characteristics as controls, 
according to the stream of accounting research. 
Thus, the present research adopts the following as 
control variables: ROE, TOBIN, BETA, 
LN_EMPLOYEES, FINANCIAL, FTSE_MIB. ROE is 
commonly considered accounting-based measures 
(Muttakin & Khan, 2014; Gao et al., 2016; Qiu, 
Shaukat, & Tharyan, 2016). ROE is measured as the 
net income during the year 2017 that has been 
scaled by shareholder value equity, in line with prior 
research (Pavlopoulos, Magnis, & Iatridis, 2017; 
Baboukardos, 2018). The research further includes 
other financial-based measures to take into account 
risks. TOBIN as a measure of financial performance, 
and BETA as a measure of risks, are taken into 
consideration. Tobin’s q is the market’s assessment 
of a firm’s future cash flows and the riskiness of 
that cash flow (Cahan et al., 2016), whereas BETA is 
the risk market measure using the Capital Assets 
Pricing Model (CAPM). This study opts for the 
inclusion of LN_EMPLOYEES to measure the size of 
the company. Moreover, the number of employees 
represents the primary criterion of the Directive on 
non-financial information disclosure; thus, the size 
was assessed with the number of employees 
accordingly. In line with previous literature 
(Skouloudis et al., 2014; Halkos & Skouloudis, 2016; 
Qiu, Shaukat, & Tharyan, 2016), LN_EMPLOYEES was 
the number of employees scaled by the natural 
logarithm to define the size of the company. Finally, 
the analysis included FINANCIAL as control to 
discern whether the company belonged to the 
financial sector (then assigned the value of “1”) or 
not (in this case, the assigned value was “0”) and 
FTSE_MIB as control to discern whether the company 
belonged to the index FTSE MIB (value assigned “1”) 
or not (value assigned “0”). 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
Table 4 provides the descriptive results of the NFI 
disclosure score. The level of compliance is equal to 
83.17% in mean; this means that, on average, the 
sample under investigation has achieved a great 
level of disclosure on NFI mandatory in the first year 
of its compulsory implementation. The median NFI 
disclosure score is 82.35%: this explains the central 
tendency of data. In our case, there is a lower 
dispersion of values around the mean because the 
mean and the median of the level of the NFI 
disclosure score are close to each other. This is 
proved by the low value of standard deviation, which 
is equal to 0.09084. All the companies show an NFI 
disclosure score that is higher than 50%; the 
minimum is 64.70%, whereas the maximum is 100%, 
with a range of values equal to 35.21%.  
Looking at quartiles, it is possible to notice that 
the lower quartile corresponding to the 25th 
percentile exhibits an NFI disclosure score that is 
lower than 76.69%; thus, 25% of companies get an 
NFI disclosure score to the left of 76.69%. On the 
other hand, the upper quartile representing the 75th 
percentile shows an NFI disclosure score higher than 
88.23%, namely, 75% of groups mark NFI disclosure 
score to the right of 88.23%. Looking the distribution 
of the NFI disclosure score, 7.09% of the sample (10 
cases out of 141) provided a disclosure lower than 
69.99%, 34.04% of the sample (48 cases out of 141) is 
grouped in the range of 70.00%-79.99%. Almost half 
of the sample, corresponding to 36.87% (78 cases 
out of 141), provides an NFI disclosure between 
80.00% and 89.99%, and this confirms the central 
tendencies of the mean and the median. Finally, a 
considerable part of the sample, representing 
21.985% (31 cases out of 141), has achieved a score 
between 90.00% and 100%. This means that 
companies are compliant with high levels of NFI 
disclosure score. Such high levels are even 
corroborated if looking at the cumulative 
frequencies. Only the 7.09% of the groups show 
disclosure levels lower than 69.99%, 41.13% of the 
groups exhibit an NFI disclosure score lower than 
79.99%, and 78.01% (more than three-quarters of the 
sample) achieve an NFI disclosure score lower than 
89.99%. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the dependent 
variable 
 
N  141 
Mean  0.83173 
Median  0.82352 
St. Dev.  0.09084 
Skewness  0.122 
Kurtosis  -0.655 
Min  0.64705 
Max  1.00000 











0.6000–0.6999 10 7.09 7.09 
0.7000–0.7999 48 34.04 41.13 
0.8000–0.8999 52 36.87 78.01 
0.9000–1.0000 31 21.98 100.00 
Total 141 100.00 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the NFI 
disclosure score. Data are normally distributed: this 
is confirmed by their skewness (equal to 0.122) and 
Kurtosis (equal to -0.655). Specifically, the disclosure 
score distribution is skewed to the right and 
platykurtic. Overall, the descriptive findings of the 
dependent variable show that the requirements were 
actively applied, suggesting promising avenues for 
further implementations. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of the NFI disclosure score 
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Table 5 shows the descriptive results of the 
independent variable and controls in case they are 
numerical variables. The variable OWN_CONC has a 
mean of 53.83%, which explain a high level of 
ownership concentration in the sample. The 
minimum value is equal to 0.00% (because two 
companies did not have any relevant shareholders), 
whereas the maximum is equal to 99.48% (the 
maximum refers to a company for which only 
privileged shares were traded, whereas ordinary 
shares were not), which a dispersion of data of 
20.65%. The skewness of -0.772 indicates that the 
frequency distribution of ownership concentration is 
right-skewed. The kurtosis is equal to 0.130, namely 
the frequency distribution is leptokurtic. The 
variable BETA gets a mean of 0.9466 which indicates 
that in mean companies have lower volatility (< 1), 
thus are less risky. The minimum is equal to 0.2710 
(less risky) whereas the maximum value is 1.75 (high 
risk). When considering the variable ROE, we can see 
a mean equal to 8.99% with extreme values as 
minimum and maximum. The distribution of related 
data is skewed to the left (skewness equal to -0.714) 
and leptokurtic (Kurtosis equal to 5.454). The 
variable TOBIN has a mean of 0.9105 which suggests 
that companies’ stocks are undervalued in mean 
because values are between 0 and 1, thus indicating 
that it costs more to replace fa firm’s assets that 
how much the firm is worth. Ultimately, the variable 
LN_EMPLOYEES expresses the size of the company 
and is computed in the model with the natural 
logarithm of the number of employees. 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the independent variables 
 
Variables Min Max Mean St. dev. Asymmetry Kurtosis 
OWN_CONC 0.00000 0.99484 0.53835 0.20658 -0.77200 0.13000 
REPORT_FORMAT 0,00000 1,00000     
REPORT_YEAR 1,00000 18,00000     
FTSE_MIB 0,00000 1,00000     
FINANCIAL 0,00000 1,00000     
BETA 0,27100 1,75200 0,94669 0,28886 -0,05258 -0,15170 
ROE -0,59427 0,68628 0,08998 0,15274 -0,71434 5,45468 
TOBIN 0,01071 7,33960 0,91052 1,12895 2,67075 9,17425 
LN_EMPLOYEES 6,20456 11,48135 8,09090 1,31839 0,63736 -0,27012 
 
Table 6 shows the Pearson correlation. The 
results are useful to verify the presence of 
multicollinearity between the independent variables 
which could negatively affect the OLS regression 
analysis. In fact, in the OLS regression analysis, the 
correlation between the independent variables is not 
admitted, as it distorts both the regression 
parameters and the standard errors. Therefore, the 
analysis tests the lack of perfect multicollinearity 
between the independent variables using Pearson 
correlation. The Pearson correlations indicate no 
relevant multicollinearity issues existing in the 
variables in our model. Even by additionally 
checking whether any multicollinearity with the 
Variation Inflation Factor (VIF), the results sort out 
that the OLS regression analysis is not likely to be 
affected by multicollinearity and the multivariate 
results hold consistent regression parameters. 
 
Table 6. Correlation matrix 
 















Pearson Correlation 1        
Sign. (two tails) 
 
       
REPORT_ 
YEAR 
Pearson Correlation -0,002 1       
Sign. (two tails) 0,978 
 
      
FTSE_MIB 
Pearson Correlation 0,036 ,510** 1      
Sign. (two tails) 0,670 0,000 
 
     
FINANCIAL 
Pearson Correlation -0,075 ,378** ,229** 1     
Sign. (two tails) 0,374 0,000 0,006 
 
    
BETA 
Pearson Correlation -0,127 ,179* 0,157 ,391** 1    
Sign. (two tails) 0,135 0,033 0,064 0,000 
 
   
ROE 
Pearson Correlation -0,130 -0,016 0,146 -0,073 -0,056 1   




Pearson Correlation -0,030 -0,106 0,028 -,184* -,235** ,448** 1  





Pearson Correlation 0,042 ,509** ,539** 0,141 0,144 -0,074 -0,132 1 
Sign. (two tails) 0,617 0,000 0,000 0,096 0,090 0,386 0,118 
 
 Note: Sig. (2-tailed) in brackets 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7 presents the multivariate analysis 
which exhibits the relationship between the NFI 
disclosure score and the ownership concentration. 
The aim is to establish whether the NFI disclosure 
score is related to ownership concentration and to 
validate the estimate. We can see from the results 
that ownership concentration affects the level of NFI 
disclosure. The coefficient is statistically significant 
and negative. In more detail, the coefficient of 
OWN_CONC is equal to -0.191 with a p-value < 
0.1000, which means that an increase of one percent 
in ownership concentration leads to a lower of the 
NFI disclosure score, which enjoys a 0.191% 
decrease. In other words, the relationship between 
the level of NFI disclosure and ownership 
concentration is negative, namely, the level of NFI 
disclosure score decreases by 0.191%, when 
ownership concentration increases of 1 percent. 
These results are in line with the academic studies 
which confirms a negative relationship. 
 











R2 = 0,18705 
R2 adj = 0,13120 
N = 141 
Note: Beta with * p-value < 0.1; ** p-value <0.05;  
*** p-value < 0.01 for the NFI_disclosure_score 
 
When looking at the control variables we can 
see that REPORT_YEAR, FINANCIAL, ROE are 
statistically significant. Considering the variable 
REPORT_YEAR, it appears that the relationship 
between the level of compliance and the number of 
years of prior NFI reporting is positive (beta 
coefficient = 0.186) and significant (p-value = 0.087). 
This means that the companies that have one-year 
experience disclosing NFI in the past are more likely 
to achieve a higher level of compliance which 
increases by 0.186%. The variable FINANCIAL 
suggests that moving from 0 (Financial sector) to 1 
(Non-financial sector), the level of NFI disclosure is 
decreasing by 0.164%. ROE is positively and 
significantly associated with the NFI disclosure 
score, as the beta coefficient is 0.07343 with a p-
value less than 0.10 (equal to 0.09293). Overall, the 
controls we added in our model have the 
explanatory power to hold the results. The model 
has an R-squared of 0.18705 which is an acceptable 
value by considering the subjectivity of the 
dependent variable and the few studies which focus 
on ownership concentration in Italy. The Adjusted 
R-squared of 0.13120 indicates that all the controls 
in the model express the analysis. To greatly specify 
the analysis, it could be possible to add other 
controls, and therefore, to see whether results hold 
such significance.  
These findings indicate that our estimates of 
the NFI disclosure scores hold a significant and 
negative sign for the relationship between the level 
of NFI mandatory disclosure and ownership 
concentration. In other words, there is a negative 
relation between the level of compliance with NFI 
mandatory disclosure valid in the first year of the 
regulatory adequacy and ownership concentration. 
Contextualized in the Italian setting, this means that 
Italian listed companies with high ownership 
concentration have tended to provide a lower level 
of disclosure of NFI. Such a linkage might be 
explained by the close relationship between equity 
owners holding a large number of shares, the board 
of directors and managers which may consequently 
drive and influence decision-making on the 
disclosure of NFI. In more details, shareholders and 
the team management might perceive the disclosure 
of NFI as a mere “costly, binding and forced task” 
which may potentially reduce short-term firm profit 
available for distribution. This might be especially 
more emphasized in the first years of the adherence 
to the compulsory requirements of NFI disclosure. In 
keeping with this logic, the compliance with NFI 
mandatory disclosure is lower, and this seems to be 
the case here, in this first year of regulatory 
adequacy. This fruitfully leads further reflections 
toward a re-consideration of responsible business 
practices and related disclosures as strategic tactics 
jointly linked to the core business rather than a 
purely constrained exercise.   
This discussion suggests that the results are 
bounded around the first year of the NFI mandatory 
disclosure implementation, therefore several 
avenues of research can be drawn for future 
investigations. Accordingly, the next section 
addresses the concluding remarks by linking our 
results to prior research, acknowledges the 
limitations of the present study and proposes future 
research directions. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The present research has investigated the 
relationship between the level of NFI disclosure and 
ownership concentration in the first year of the 
regulatory adequacy of the compulsory 
requirements. The research has been motivated by a 
lack of consistency in defining a clear-cut relation 
between ownership structure and engagement with 
CSR issues (Faller, 2018). Keeping with this literature 
gap, the research has aimed to contribute to such a 
debate, and therefore, the study has been designed 
around a peculiar setting of investigation, 
characterized by high ownership concentration, as 
the case of Italy. With this premise, the study has 
developed the NFI disclosure score, and it has tested 
whether ownership concentration affects the level of 
NFI mandatory disclosure in Italy. The level of 
compliance is relatively high, (83.17% in mean), 
suggesting that companies has greatly reacted to the 
legal requirements enforced by regulators. For 
instance, the NFI statements have been all prepared 
according to the GRI’s international standard 
framework, and this confirms the unanimous 
consensus regarding the adoption of this 
international standard framework. As demonstrated 
by the higher level of compliance with mandatory 
requirements, empirical research supports the 
regulative legitimacy of compliance with and 
adherence to regulations. This holds the theoretical 
grounds related to institutional legitimacy as 
compliance with established institutional logics 
(Chen & Roberts, 2010; Chelli et al., 2018). However 
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when disclosure is mandated by law, companies may 
be inclined to refer to it in a symbolic fashion for 
maintaining corporate legitimacy. In comparable 
situations, it may become likely that a company will 
decouple its communication about norm application 
from its actual implementation practices (Meyer et 
al., 1977; Suchman, 1995). In the context of comply 
or explain, it has been observed and argued that 
companies have reason to apply conformity, that 
they tick the boxes instead of disclosing their 
concrete actions (Arcot, Bruno, & Faure-Grimaud, 
2010). Therefore, these results constitute first 
exploratory insights on the approach toward the 
implementation of the mandatory requirements on 
the disclosure of NFI. 
When considering the effect of ownership 
concentration on NFI mandatory disclosure, the 
study has identified a significant and negative 
relationship among the two variables of interest. As 
a matter of fact, the coefficient for ownership 
concentration is negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting that an increase of one 
percent of ownership concentration leads to a lower 
level of compliance of 0.191%. This confirms what 
has been already found in some studies in which it 
is suggested that the disclosure of NFI is less spread 
when equity ownership is concentrated. This means 
that when shares are in the hands of few owners, the 
level of compliance with NFI mandatory disclosure 
decreases. This confirms the findings of prior 
scholarly works which have identified a negative 
relation between ownership concentration and CSR 
issues (Clark & Hebb, 2005; Muttakin & Khan, 2014; 
Faller, 2018).  
 
The study acknowledges the following 
limitations. First, the research has analysed one 
country: this has helped us to deeply focus on the 
mandatory requirements of the Italian national law 
on NFI disclosure which vary in comparison to other 
European countries because of the different 
transpositions of the Directive 2014/95/UE on the 
disclosure of NFI into national laws. Second, the 
study has considered one year of analysis: we have 
selected the first year of such a regulatory 
implementation to draw explorative results into this 
new setting.  
Following these arguments, future research 
directions can be outlined accordingly. Academic 
studies might develop comparative-countries 
analysis to highlight the differences within this new 
context of NFI mandatory disclosure considering the 
development of the disclosure of NFI over time. 
Furthermore, it might be of interest to investigate 
the effectiveness of the regulatory adequacy and 
explore whether such application depends on the 
ownership structure such as family equity 
ownership, state equity ownership, institutional 
investor equity ownership, and small business 
ownership. Similarly, within this mandatory regime 
of NFI disclosure, it becomes crucial to understand 
the underlying reasons in approaching to CSR issues 
to discern mere compliant approaches against 
responsible business practices, and, in what follows, 
to examine any interdependence with both 
ownership concentration and ownership structure. 
Future research is highly encouraged to fruitfully 
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APPENDIX A (Part 1) 
 
Name 
Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) taxonomy 
FTSE Italia All-Share Composition 
A2A Utilities Ftse Mib 
AEFFE Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
AMPLIFON Health Care Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
ANSALDO STS Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
AQUAFIL Basic Materials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
ASCOPIAVE Utilities Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
ASTALDI Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
ASTM Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
ATLANTIA Industrials Ftse Mib 
AUTOGRILL Consumer Services Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
AVIO Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
AZIMUT HOLDING Financials Ftse Mib 
BANCA CARIGE Financials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
BANCA GENERALI Financials Ftse Mib 
BANCA IFIS Financials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
BANCA INTERMOBILIARE Financials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
BANCA MEDIOLANUM Financials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
BANCA MONTE PASCHI SIENA Financials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
BANCA POPOLARE SONDRIO Financials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
BANCO BPM Financials Ftse Mib 
BANCO DI DESIO E BRIANZA Financials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
BASICNET Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
BE Technology Ftse Italia Small Cap 
BEGHELLI Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
BIALETTI INDUSTRIE Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
BIANCAMANO Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
BIESSE Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
BPER BANCA Financials Ftse Mib 
BREMBO Consumer Goods Ftse Mib 
BRUNELLO CUCINELLI Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
BUZZI UNICEM Industrials Ftse Mib 
CAD IT Technology Ftse Italia Small Cap 
CAIRO COMMUNICATION Consumer Services Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
CALTAGIRONE Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
CAMPARI Consumer Goods Ftse Mib 
CARRARO Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
CATTOLICA ASSICURAZIONI Financials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
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Name 
Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) taxonomy 
FTSE Italia All-Share Composition 
CEMENTIR HOLDING Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
CERVED INFORMATION SOLUTIONS Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
CIR Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
COFIDE Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
CREDITO EMILIANO Financials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
CREDITO VALTELLINESE Financials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
CSP INTERNATIONAL Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
DAMIANI Consumer Services Ftse Italia Small Cap 
DANIELI & C Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
DATALOGIC Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
DE' LONGHI Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
DIASORIN Health Care Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
DOBANK Financials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
EDISON Utilities Ftse Italia Small Cap 
EI TOWERS Technology Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
EL EN Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
ELICA Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
EMAK Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
ENAV Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
ENEL Utilities Ftse Mib 
ENI Oil & Gas Ftse Mib 
ERG Utilities Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
ESPRINET Technology Ftse Italia Small Cap 
EUKEDOS Health Care Ftse Italia Small Cap 
EXPRIVIA Technology Ftse Italia Small Cap 
FIERA MILANO Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
FILA Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
FINCANTIERI Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
FNM Consumer Services Ftse Italia Small Cap 
GAMENET Consumer Services Ftse Italia Small Cap 
GEFRAN Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
GENERALI Financials Ftse Mib 
GEOX Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
GRUPPO CERAMICHE RICCHETTI Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
HERA Utilities Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
IL SOLE 24 ORE Consumer Services Ftse Italia Small Cap 
IMA Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
IMMSI Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
INTERPUMP GROUP Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
INTESA SANPAOLO Financials Ftse Mib 
IRCE Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
IREN Utilities Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
ISAGRO Basic Materials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
ITALGAS Utilities Ftse Mib 
ITALMOBILIARE Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
LA DORIA Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
LANDI RENZO Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
LEONARDO Industrials Ftse Mib 
LUVE Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
LUXOTTICA GROUP Consumer Goods Ftse Mib 
MAIRE TECNIMONT Oil & Gas Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
MARR Consumer Services Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
MASSIMO ZANETTI BEVERAGE Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
MEDIASET Consumer Services Ftse Mib 
MEDIOBANCA Financials Ftse Mib 
MONCLER Consumer Goods Ftse Mib 
MONRIF Consumer Services Ftse Italia Small Cap 
MUTUIONLINE Financials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
NICE Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
OPENJOBMETIS Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
OVS Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
PANARIAGROUP INDUSTRIE CERAMICHE Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
PARMALAT Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
PIAGGIO & C Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
PININFARINA Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
PIQUADRO Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
PIRELLI & C Consumer Goods Ftse Mib 
PRIMA INDUSTRIE Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
PRYSMIAN Industrials Ftse Mib 
RAI WAY Consumer Services Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
RATTI Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
RCS MEDIAGROUP Consumer Services Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
RECORDATI Health Care Ftse Mib 
RENO DE MEDICI  Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
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Name 
Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) taxonomy 
FTSE Italia All-Share Composition 
SABAF Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
SAES GETTERS Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
SAFILO GROUP Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
SAIPEM Oil & Gas Ftse Mib 
SALINI IMPREGILO Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
SALVATORE FERRAGAMO Consumer Goods Ftse Mib 
SARAS Oil & Gas Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
SESA Technology Ftse Italia Small Cap 
SIAS Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
SNAITECH Consumer Services Ftse Italia Small Cap 
SNAM Utilities Ftse Mib 
SOGEFI Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Small Cap 
SOL Basic Materials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
TECHNOGYM Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
TELECOM ITALIA Telecommunications Ftse Mib 
TERNA Utilities Ftse Mib 
TESMEC Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
TISCALI Technology Ftse Italia Small Cap 
TOD'S Consumer Goods Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
TOSCANA AEROPORTI Industrials Ftse Italia Small Cap 
TXT Technology Ftse Italia Small Cap 
UBI BANCA Financials Ftse Mib 
UNICREDIT Financials Ftse Mib 
UNIEURO Consumer Services Ftse Italia Small Cap 
UNIPOL Financials Ftse Mib 
VITTORIA ASSICURAZIONI Financials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
YOOX NET-A-PORTER GROUP Consumer Services Ftse Mib 
ZIGNAGO VETRO Industrials Ftse Italia Mid Cap 
 
 
APPENDIX B. NFI DISCLOSURE LIST OF ITEMS (Part 1) 
 
Content topic N. 





The business model with reference to environmental issues 
(current period) 
General-topic disclosure 
2 Policies on environmental matters (current period) General-topic disclosure 
3 Results on environmental matters (current period) General-topic disclosure 
4 Results on environmental matters (prior period) General-topic disclosure 
5 Energy consumption within the organization KPIs 
6 Energy consumption outside of the organization KPIs 
7 Energy intensity KPIs 
8 Reduction of energy consumption KPIs 
9 Reductions in energy requirements of products and services KPIs 
10 Water withdrawal by source KPIs 
11 Water sources significantly affected by the withdrawal of water KPIs 
12 Water recycled and reused KPIs 
13 Direct (Scope1) GHG emissions KPIs 
14 Energy indirect (Scope 2) GHG emissions KPIs 
15 Other indirect (Scope 3) GHG emissions KPIs 
16 GHG emissions intensity KPIs 
17 Reduction of GHG emissions KPIs 
18 Emissions of ozone-depleting substances (ODS) KPIs 
19 
Nitrogen oxides (Nox) sulfur oxides (Sox), and other significant air 
emissions 
KPIs 
20 Water discharge by quality and destination KPIs 
21 Waste by type and disposal method KPIs 
22 Significant spills  KPIs 
23 Transport of hazardous waste KPIs 
24 Water bodies affected by water discharges and or runoff KPIs 
25 




Identification of effects on environmental matters related to 
business relationships, products or services 
Specific-topic disclosure 









28 Business Model on social matters (current period) General-topic disclosure 
29 Policies on social matters (current period) General-topic disclosure 
30 Results on social matters (current period) General-topic disclosure 
31 Results on social matters (prior period) General-topic disclosure 
32 
Identification of key risks and opportunities effects on social 
matters (current period) 
General-topic disclosure 
33 
Actions to ensure gender diversity opportunity (actions in favor of 
childhood, families etc.) 
Specific-topic disclosure 
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Content topic N. 





Operations with local community engagement, impact assessment, 
and development programs 
KPIs 
35 
Operations with significant actual and potential negative impacts 
on local communities  
KPIs 
36 New suppliers that were screened using social criteria KPIs 
37 Negative social impacts in the supply chain and actions taken  KPIs 
38 Political contributions KPIs 
39 
Assessment of the health and safety impacts of product and 
service categories  
KPIs 
40 
Incidents of non-compliance concerning the health and safety 
impacts of products and services  
KPIs 
41 Requirements for products and service information and labeling KPIs 
42 
Incidents of non-compliance concerning product and service 
information and labelling 
KPIs 
43 




Substantiated complaints concerning breaches of customer privacy 
and losses of customer data  
KPIs 
Employee matters  
45 
Business Model with reference to employee matters (current 
period) 
General-topic disclosure 
46 Policies on employee matters (current period) General-topic disclosure 
47 Results on employee matters (current period) General-topic disclosure 
48 Results on employee matters for prior periods (prior period) General-topic disclosure 
49 New employee hires and employee turnover KPIs 
50 
Benefits provided to full-time employees that are not provided to 
temporary or part-time employees. 
KPIs 
51 Parental leave KPIs 
52 Minimum notice periods regarding operational changes KPIs 
53 
Workers representation in formal joint management-worker health 
and safety committees 
KPIs 
54 
Types of injury and rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost 
days, absenteeism, and number of work-related fatalities 
KPIs 
55 




Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements with trade 
unions 
KPIs 
57 Average hours of training per year per employee KPIs 
58 




Percentage of employees receiving regular performance and career 
development reviews 
KPIs 
60 Identification of key risks and opportunities on employee matters General-topic disclosure 
Human rights 
61 Business model on human rights matters (current period) General-topic disclosure 
62 Policies on human rights matters (current period) General-topic disclosure 
63 Results on human rights matters (current period) General-topic disclosure 
64 Results on human rights matters (prior period) General-topic disclosure 
65 Incidents of discrimination and corrective action are taken KPIs 
66 
Operations and suppliers in which the right to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining may be at risk  
KPIs 
67 




Operations and suppliers at significant risk for incidents forced or 
compulsory labor 
KPIs 
69 Security personnel trained in human rights policies or procedures KPIs 
70 Incidents of violations involving rights of indigenous peoples  KPIs 
71 
Operations that have been subject to human rights reviews or 
impact assessments 
KPIs 
72 Employee training on human rights policies or procedures KPIs 
73 
Significant investment agreements and contracts that include 
human rights clauses or that underwent human right screening  
KPIs 
74 
Identification of key risks and opportunities from human rights 




Business Model with reference to anticorruption matters (current 
period) 
General-topic disclosure 
76 References to 231 related to anti-corruption General-topic disclosure 
77 Policies against corruption (current period) GRI 205-2 - G4-SO4 General-topic disclosure 
78 Results on anti-corruption (current period) GRI 205-1 - G4-SO5 General-topic disclosure 
79 Results on anti-corruption (prior period) General-topic disclosure 
80 Confirmed incidents of corruption and action taken KPIs 
81 
Legal actions for anti-competitive behavior, anti-trust, and 
monopoly practices  
KPIs 
82 
Identification of key risks and opportunities on anti-corruption 
matters (current period) 
General-topic disclosure 
